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Introduction

The attorney-client privilege is "one of the oldest recognized
privileges for confidential communications." 1 The purpose of the
privilege is to promote "full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients, and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and the administration of justice., 2 The attorneyclient privilege recognizes that in order for an attorney to give sound
legal advice, he or she must be fully informed by the client., It is
believed that confidentiality of communications between attorneys and
their clients will improve such communications and lead to more
effective legal services.4 This privilege is recognized by the ABA Code
of Professional Conduct, which states
[a] lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the
matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full
advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the
exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate
the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant.
The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold
inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only
facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek
early legal assistance. 5
Although courts have long recognized the attorney-client privilege,
the extension of the privilege to governmental attorneys has only been
fairly recent.6
Courts recognize that, in the civil setting, the
governmental attorney-client privilege is "rather absolute."7 The circuits
have split, however, regarding the question of whether the governmental
attorney-client privilege applies when a governmental attorney is faced
1. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
2. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
3. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1995).
4. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 531 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000)).
5. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1995).

6. See Patricia E.Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your [Government] Lawyer
May Be Held Against You-The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client Confidentiality,
35 URB. LAW. 283, 287 (Spring 2003).
7. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1271; see also In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 399 F.3d at 532 (The governmental attorney-client privilege may be
invoked in a civil suit.); In re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289,
291 (7th Cir. 2002) (In a civil suit, the government may assert the governmental attorneyclient privilege.).
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with a grand jury subpoena.8 Those who do not support the privilege in
this context argue that, as part of their duty to the general public,
governmental attorneys should not be permitted to shield wrongdoing by
government officials. 9 Those supporting the privilege fear that denial of
the privilege will result in a chilling effect. 10 Their concern is that
officials will not discuss matters with government counsel because they
fear that the content of the conversations will one day be revealed. 1
Government officials are different than the general public, as
officials have governmental attorneys at hand who can readily inform
them about the law.' 2 Officials, for the most part, readily understand the
rules and can act based on the legal advice they receive. 13 However, we
still cannot assume that government officials are completely
knowledgeable regarding every aspect of the law. Nor can we assume
that a government official will know that present actions will result in
criminal liability in the future. 14 Like the ordinary layperson, it is
difficult for a government official to know ex ante what actions he or she
takes will result in a criminal violation. 15 This is because of both the
complexities of the law and the complexities of his or her duties in
government as well. 16 In order to fully benefit from having counsel
readily available to answer any legal questions, government officials
must be assured that any information an official reveals to a
governmental attorney will not one day be used against him by that
attorney in a court of law.
This Comment will argue that the governmental attorney-client
privilege should be upheld in both the civil and the criminal contexts.
The governmental attorney-client privilege protects the public interest by
allowing government officials to freely discuss any legal matter with the
attorney. 17 Not recognizing the privilege would result in a chilling effect
in communications between government officials and the counsel who

8. See In Re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 290; In re
Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1271; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d
910, 917 (8th Cir. 1997). But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 535.
9.

10.
11.
12.

See In reBruceR. Lindsey, 158 F.3dat 1273.

See id. at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
See id.
See Todd A. Ellinwood, "In the Light of Reason and Experience ": The Casefor

a Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1291, 1303 (2001).
13. See id.

14.
15.

See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Ellinwood, supra note 12, at 1319 (citing Jeremy Rabkin, At the President's

Side: The Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, LAW &

16.

Autumn 1993, at 63, 76).
Id. (citing Rabkin, supra note 15, at 63, 76).

17.

See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 932 (Kopf, J.,

CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS,

dissenting).
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have undertaken to serve their office.' 8 The result will be either that the
official will not be fully informed about the laws that affect him, or will
have to outsource a large amount of his work to private counsel, even for
the -most routine matters.' 9 Though the courts have been left to
determine when a privilege applies,2 ° Congress and the state legislative
bodies must step in and pass a statute that will protect the governmental
attorney-client privilege.
Part II of this comment will discuss the attorney-client privilege,
describing the privilege, its history, and when it may apply. Part III will
discuss the sources that are often used to define the extent to which the
governmental attorney-client privilege is recognized. Part IV will
discuss the circuit split regarding whether the privilege applies in the
face of a grand jury subpoena. Part V will argue that the governmental
attorney-client privilege should be upheld in the face of a grand jury
subpoena. Because leaving the courts to decide when the governmental
attorney-client privilege applies has resulted in uncertainty and a split
among the circuits of the Federal Court of Appeals, it is the duty of the
legislatures to provide protection to the governmental attorney-client
privilege.
II.

The Attorney-Client Privilege in General

Dean John Henry Wigmore, an American legal scholar whose work
has heavily influenced evidence law in America, 2' defined the attorneyclient privilege as follows:
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5)by the client, (6) are at his
insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by
22
the legal adviser, (8), except the protection be waived.
Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., who co-authored
a treatise on federal practice and procedure, outline the major arguments
as to why the attorney-client privilege should apply to a given situation.
First, because of the complexities of the law, comprehension of the law

18. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1285 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
19. See id. at 1284.
20. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
21. Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and the High-Profile Client-Should the
Attorney-Client PrivilegeExtend to Communications with Public Relations Consultants?,

55 SYRACUSE L. REv. 545, 548 (2005) (citing Edward J. lmwinkelried & Glen
Weissenberger, AN EVIDENCE ANTHOLOGY 7 (1996)).
22. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292

(McNaughton rev. 1961).
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would be impossible for a layperson.23 Second, since it is in the public's
interest that everyone understand the law, the best way for laypersons to
learn the law is to consult those who are knowledgeable of the law.24 In
order to give the best advice he can, the lawyer must be aware of all facts
pertaining to the case.25 If a client feels that certain information will not
be privileged, then he will reveal only the favorable facts, hindering the
attorney's ability to properly assess his case.26 Even though some
evidence may be concealed from the trier of fact, Wright and Graham
believe that
the benefits to society by recognizing the privilege outweigh
27
the costs.
Having started in Elizabethan England,2 8 the privilege found its way
into American evidentiary law. The privilege was shaped over time by
the common law in the United States and continues to be molded by
common law to this day. 29 A detailed examination of the history of the
attorney-client privilege is now in order.
A.

The History of the Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege regarding
confidential communications known to the common law. 30 The attorneyclient privilege first appeared in Elizabethan England and was linked to
the barristers' code of honor.3 1 Dean Wigmore found that the roots of
the privilege extend back to the "reign of Elizabeth., 32 The attorneyclient privilege was viewed more as a duty of honor among men than an
evidentiary privilege,3 3 as revealing a client's secrets was seen as
dishonorable.34
In the Eighteenth Century, two cases, the Duchess of Kingston
Case35 and Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea,36 caused the privilege to

23.

24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 5472, at 87-88 (1986).
24. 24 id. § 5475, at 87-88.
25. Id.

26.

Id.

27. Id.
28. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 531 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 1 JOHN
W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 343-46 (5th ed. 1999)).
29. See Murphy, supra note 21, at 560; see also FED. R. EvID. 501.
30. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
31. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 531 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 1
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 87, at 343-46).
32. Murphy, supra note 21, at 549 (citing 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291, at 3200 (1905)).
33. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2286, at 3187-88.
34.
1 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:2, at
11.
35. 20 How. St. Tr. 586 (1776).
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disappear for a period of time in England.37 As Dean Wigmore and
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. noted, use of the privilege only arose a limited
number of times as the Eighteenth Century closed. 38 The attorney-client
privilege was revived in 1833, however, by two opinions written by Lord
Brougham. 39 Lord Brougham stated that "[i]f the privilege did not exist
at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal resources.
Deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to
consult any skillful person, or would only dare to tell his counselor half
his case. ' ' 40 Recognition of the attorney-client privilege then became
more widespread, as Dean Wigmore noted that courts began to recognize
a new theory that viewed confidentiality between attorneys and clients
as
41
necessary in order to encourage laymen to freely seek legal advice.
In Dixon v. Parmelee,42 which was decided in 1829, the attorneyclient privilege was recognized in America for the first time.43 Even
though the court in Dixon held that the attorney-client privilege would
not apply to the given facts in the case at hand, the court still recognized
the privilege.4 4 The court stated that, during the time of the relationship
between the attorney and the client, the client had the right to have
disclosures made to his counsel pertaining to his case kept confidential.4 5
As time progressed a number of treaties were written on the attorneyclient privilege by American scholars, and the privilege became firmly
established in American evidentiary law. 46 Although the attorney-client
privilege has not been codified, determination of when the privilege
applies is left to the evolving common law under Federal Rule of

36.

17 How. St. Tr. 1229 (1743).

37.

Murphy, supra note 21, at 550-52.

Murphy describes each of these cases in

detail, explaining that the concern of the courts was that the only benefit of the privilege
would be to shield the guilty from justice. Murphy also notes that the concurring opinion
in Annesley by Baron Mounteney formed the basis for the present-day crime-fraud
exception to the privilege. Id.
38. Id. at 553 (citing 4 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2290, at 3193-96; see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1073 (1978).
39. Murphy, supra note 21, at 553-54. For these opinions, see Bolton v. Corporation
of Liverpool, 1 Myl. & K. 98, 99, 39 Eng. Rep. 614, 615 (Ch. 1833); Greenough v.
Gaskell, 1 Myl. & K. 98, 99, 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 619 (Ch. 1833).
40. Murphy, supra note 21, at 554 (quoting Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Myl. & K. 98,
103 (Ch. 1833)).
41. Id. at 553 (citing 4 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2290, at 3194 (1905).
42. 2 Vt. 185, 193 (1829).
43. Murphy, supra note 21, at 554.
44. Id. (citing Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. at 188-90 (1829)).
45. Murphy, supra note 21, at 554 (citing Dixon, 2 Vt. at 188).
46. Murphy, supra note 21, at 554 (2005). Examples of such early treatises include
ones written by Harvard professors Simon Greenleaf and James B. Thayer, as well as
Dean John Henry Wigmore. Id.
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47

Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege

The Supreme Court has noted the importance of the privilege,
stating that allowing attorneys to be fully informed "promote[s] broader
' 48
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.
Because privileges such as the attorney-client privilege shield evidence
from exposure, however, the Supreme Court has stated that such
privileges should "not be lightly created nor expansively construed, for
they are in derogation of the search of the truth. 4 9 Even Dean Wigmore,
who supported the attorney-client privilege, recognized that "the public
has a right to every man's evidence. '50 Dean Wigmore noted that good
reason must exist for any created privilege, and any privilege created
should only be extended to the minimum amount necessary to uphold the
interests protected by the privilege.5 1 Therefore, the attorney-client
privilege does not automatically attach to any communication between
client and counsel 2
When a client asserts the privilege, the client has the burden of
proving that the privilege applies in that given case. 3 In order for the
attorney-client privilege to apply, Dean Wigmore established "four
fundamental conditions" which must exist for the attorney-client
privilege to apply:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed;
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
3. The relation must be on which the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered; and
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for

47. FED. R. EvID. 501.
48. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389.
49. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
50. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW, § 2192, at 2968 (1904).
51. 3 id. § 2192, at 2968.
52.

See id.

53.

See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

1016

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:4

54
the correct disposal of litigation.

When the privilege applies, the privilege belongs to the client. 55 It is
expected that the attorney
will take steps to safeguard the privilege on
56
client.
the
of
behalf
III.

Extending the Attorney-Client Privilege to Governmental Attorneys
and Their Clients

While the attorney-client privilege is firmly established in the
private setting, some question the extent of the privilege in the public
setting. This section contains a discussion of several sources used to
define the extent of the governmental attorney-client privilege.
A.

The Freedom of InformationAct

Before Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in
1967, the privilege was applied to communications to governmental
attorneys in only a few instances. 5 7 By passing the FOIA, Congress
sought to release to the public governmental information that was "long
shielded unnecessarily from public view ...
Congress did create nine
exceptions to the FOIA, however, which permitted the government to
shield certain documents from the public. 59 These exceptions, some
argue, support the proposition that Congress intended for the
governmental attorney-client privilege to exist in some form.6 °
B.

The FederalRules of Evidence

The courts turn to Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ("FRE 501") in
determining whether the attorney-client privilege applies in the context
of governmental attorneys and entities. 61 FRE 501 states that "the

54.
55.

4

WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2285, at 3185.
EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE 2 (4th ed. 2001).

56. Id.
57. Patricia E. Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your [Government] Lawyer May Be
Held Against You-The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client Confidentiality,35 URB.
LAW. 283, 287 (Spring 2003). For examples of cases where the governmental attorneyclient privilege was upheld by courts before Congress passed the Freedom of Information
Act, see Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Rowley v. Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
58. Salkin, supra note 57, at 287 (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (the
first case heard by the Supreme Court regarding the FOIA)).
59. Id. at 287. For the exceptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2002).
60. Salkin, supra note 57, at 287.
61. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir.
1997).
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privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof [is] governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted62 by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.,

Those who support the idea that the government is a "client" who is
entitled to the governmental attorney-client privilege turn to Proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 503 (Proposed Rule 503).63 Although not
enacted as a Federal Rule of Evidence, a number of circuits view
Proposed Rule 503 as "an accurate definition of the federal common law
of attorney-client privilege., 64 This rule defines "client" as "a person,
public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity,
either public or private. 65 Support for the extension of the term "client"
to reach public entities is found in the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers. The Restatement states that "[u]nless applicable law otherwise
provides, the attorney-client privilege extends to a communication of a
and of an individual officer.., of a
governmental organization..,
66
organization.',
governmental
C. United States v. Nixon
One commonly cited case discussing the extent to which the
governmental attorney-client privilege should be recognized is United
States v. Nixon. 67 Nixon is a 1974 Supreme Court case that arose out of

the Watergate scandal.68 On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia indicted seven
individuals on a number of charges, including conspiracy to defraud the
United States. 69 Even though President Richard M. Nixon was not
indicted, he was named as an unindicted coconspirator. 70 A subpoena
duces tecum 71 was issued by the district court in order to obtain tape
62.

FED. R. EVID. 501.

63.

Salkin, supra note 57, at 291.

64. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 928 (Kopf, J., dissenting)
503[02], at 503-517
(quoting 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET. AL., WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
(1975)). See, e.g., Tennenbaum v. Deloitte & Touche, 77 F.3d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 1996);
In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d
742, 751 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991); United States v. (Under Seal), 748
F.2d 871, 874 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984).
65. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1), reprintedin 56 F.R.D. 183, 235 (1972).
66. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996)).
67. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
68. Id. at 688.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 687 fn.2.
71.

See FED. RULE CRIM. P. 17(C).
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recordings and documents related to conversations that President Nixon
had with aides and advisors.72 The President filed a motion to quash the
subpoena, claiming that the requested documents 'could be kept
confidential under the executive privilege.7 3
Even though the case did not involve the question of whether a
governmental attorney-client privilege exists, principles from Nixon are
often used to support the idea that a privilege of confidentiality must give
way to the public's interest in discovering wrongdoing from
governmental officials.74 In denying President Nixon the right to the
executive privilege in this case, the Supreme Court recognized that the
need for confidential presidential communication "is fundamental to the
operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution., 75 The Court, however, refused to
recognize an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all presidential
communications. 76 Recognizing such an absolute, unqualified privilege
77
would not only conflict with the Article III judicial function of courts
but would also be "in derogation of the search for truth., 78 The Court
saw such a broad application of the privilege as a threat to the criminal
justice system, as needing to gain access to all relevant facts is
fundamental to the adversary system of justice. 79 The Court also
recognized that those who are not sure if information will remain
confidential "may well temper their candor with a concern for
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the
decisionmaking process. ,,80 In this case, however, the Court stated that it
could not conclude that advisors would temper their remarks because of
the threat of the few situations in which a criminal prosecution would
arise.8
D. Upjohn Co. v. United States
One commonly-cited case used to support a strong attorney-client
privilege is Upjohn Co. v. United States.82 Upjohn addressed the issue of
whether the attorney-client privilege applied to statements corporate

72.

Nixon, 418 U.S. at 688.

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 708.

75.

Id.

76.
77.

Id. at 703.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 710.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 705.

82.

449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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employees made to corporate counsel.8 3 Upjohn supports the attorney-

client privilege when the client is a corporation and the attorney is
corporate counsel. 84 Those supporting the governmental attorney-client
privilege often cite Upjohn, because Upjohn contains strong language
supporting the broad sweep of the attorney-client privilege.85 Also, those
supporting a governmental attorney-client privilege analogize a
governmental agency to a corporation, as both are entities and not
individuals.8 6
In Upjohn, counsel for Upjohn Company, a pharmaceutical
manufacturer, discovered that one of its foreign subsidiaries made
questionable payments to foreign government officials in order to secure
business with that foreign government. 87 An internal investigation then
began in which Upjohn's corporate counsel sent questionnaires to all
foreign managers inquiring about the payments.88 Corporate counsel
from Upjohn voluntarily disclosed such payments to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) in a report, which resulted in the IRS beginning
an investigation and issuing a summons demanding production of the
questionnaires as well as notes from interviews held with the foreign
managers.8 9 Upjohn refused to produce such documents, claiming it was
protected under the attorney-client privilege. 90
Once the case arrived on appeal to the Supreme Court, the primary
question before the Court was whether the "control group test" was the
proper test to use in determining whether the attorney-client privilege
would apply when the client is a corporation. 91 The "control group test"
was applied in the case by the Sixth Circuit court of appeals, which held
that the communications made to corporate counsel would not be
privileged because the statements were not made by those who could
direct the actions of the corporation in response to legal advice.92 The
83. Id. at 386.
84. Id. at 383-84.
85. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 913-14 (Upjohn cited
by the White House in support of the governmental attorney-client privilege in order to
show the importance of upholding the privilege).
86. Salkin, supra note 57, at 285-86.
87. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 383.
88. Id.
89. Id. For the federal statute that the IRS cited in demanding production of such
items, see 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1981).
90. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 383. Upjohn Company also claimed that the documents
were protected by the work-product doctrine, which protects documents prepared by
attorneys in anticipation of litigation. Id.
91. Id. at 386.
92. Id. at 388, 390. The first case to articulate the "control group test" was
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962), petition
for mandamus andprohibition denied, sub nam. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d

742 (3d Cir. 1962). cert. denied 372 U.S. 943 (1963). The test asks,
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Court criticized the control group test upon reversing the decision of the
Court of Appeals, stating that this test overlooked the fact that the
privilege protects the giving of information to counsel so that he may
provide informed legal advice.93 The control group test does not protect
communications made from middle- and lower-level employees made to
corporate counsel, and the Court realized that these employees also have
the ability to land the corporation into legal trouble.94 Because the
control group test does not protect the communications made by such
employees, the Court stated that the control group test "frustrates the
very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of
relevant information by employees of the client
to attorneys seeking to
' 95
render legal advice to the client corporation.
The reason why Upjohn is so often cited in cases supporting the
governmental attorney-client privilege is because of language it contains
recognizing the importance of the privilege. 96 In Upjohn, the Supreme
Court recognized that "sound legal advice or advocacy serves public
ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being
fully informed by the client." 97 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the
Court stated that the attorney-client privilege rests on the need for the
attorney to know all that relates to the client seeking legal representation
if the attorney is to perform his job to the best of his capabilities.98
Recognizing that the purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to
make full disclosure to their attorneys, 99 the Court stated that the
privilege "is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the
[k]eeping in mind that the question is, 'Is it the corporation which is seeking
the lawyer's advice when the asserted privileged communication is made?,' the
most

satisfactory

solution ...

is

that

if

the

employee

making

the

communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a position to control or even
to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation
may take upon the advice of the attorney, . . . then, in effect, he is (or
personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the
privilege would apply.
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S at 390.
93. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S at 390.
94. Id.at 391.
95. Id. at 392. In its holding, the Court declined to formulate a set of rules to follow
regarding challenges to investigatory subpoenas. The Court believed that doing so would
violate the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, stating that "[w]hile such a "case-bycase" basis may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of
the attorney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of the Rules." Id. at 396.
96. Id. at 396 ("[S]ound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.").
97. Id. at 389.
98. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)).
99. Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
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law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and
readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension
of disclosure."' 0 0
IV. Circuit Split Regarding the Govermental Attorney-Client Privilege
in Criminal Investigations
In the civil context, a governmental attorney-client privilege is
universally recognized by U.S. courts.10 1 A circuit split has recently
arisen, however, as to whether the governmental attorney-client privilege
exists when an attorney is subpoenaed by a grand jury. After decisions
issued by the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit, it
appeared as though a trend was forming where courts would not
recognize the privilege in such a setting. A recent decision from the
Second Circuit, however, recognized a governmental attorney-client
privilege in the face of a grand jury subpoena.
A.

Denying the GovernmentalAttorney-Client Privilege in the Criminal
Context

From the Whitewater scandal involving President Bill Clinton, two
cases arose in which courts refused to extend the attorney-client privilege
to governmental attorneys. Both the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
produced decisions where the court refused to extend the attorney-client
privilege to communications between the Office of the President and
White House Counsel when the White House Counsel was subpoenaed
by a grand jury. Both of these decisions, however, produced spirited
dissents which recognized that at least some protection should be
extended to communications between the President and White House
Counsel.'0 2
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, the Eighth Circuit
refused to recognize the existence of such a privilege. 0 3 The Office of
Independent Counsel (OIC) was in charge of the Whitewater
investigation. 0 4 On June 21, 1996, the OIC directed to the White House
100. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,470 (1888)).
101. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2005) (The governmental attorneyclient privilege may be invoked in a civil suit.); In re: A Witness Before the Special
Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 2002) (In a civil suit, the government may assert
the governmental attorney-client privilege.).
102. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 926-40 (8th Cir.
1997) (Kopf, J., dissenting); In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1283-89 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting).
103. In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 910.
104. Id. at 913.
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a grand jury subpoena requiring the production of "[a]ll documents
created during meetings attended by any attorney from the Office of
Counsel to the President and Hillary Rodham Clinton" regarding
Whitewater.10 5 The White House refused to produce nine sets of notes it
had in response to the subpoena, claiming that such documents were
protected by the attorney-client privilege.' 06
The OIC then filed a motion in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas to compel production of two of the nine sets of
documents on August 19, 1996.107 One set of documents contained notes
taken by Associate Counsel to the President Miriam Nemetz at a meeting
concerning First Lady Hillary Clinton's actions after the death of Deputy
Counsel to the President Vincent W. Foster.' 0 8 The second set of
documents were notes from Special Counsel to the President Jane
Sherburne regarding the discovery of billing records from the Rose Law
Firm in the residence area of the White House.' 0 9 Citing the attorneyclient privilege, the White House once again refused to produce the
requested documents." 0
In regard to the motion to compel production of the documents, the
district court held that the attorney-client privilege would prevent the
production of the requested documents.1 ' Since Mrs. Clinton and the
White House believed the conversations recorded in the documents were
privileged, the district court said that the attorney-client privilege would
apply. 2 3 The OIC then appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. "
Addressing the issue of whether the attorney-client privilege may be
used by an entity of the federal government to avoid complying with a
subpoena by a federal grand jury, the court of appeals reversed the
decision of the district court.' 1 4 In reaching its decision, the court
followed FRE 501, stating that the privilege of a government is governed

105. Id.
The White House, in refusing to produce the requested
106. Id. at 913-14.
documents, also claimed the executive privilege and the work-product doctrine. Id.
107. Id. at 914.
108. In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 914.
109. Id.
110. Id. In refusing to produce the requested documents, the White House also cited
the work product doctrine. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 914.
114. Id. at 915. The court in this case explicitly made sure to note that the holding in
this case would not apply to the attorney-client privilege between Hillary Rodham
Clinton, in her personal capacity, and her personal attorney Kendall White. Id. The court
also stated that it would not decide if the governmental attorney-client privilege would
exist in other contexts. Id.
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by the common law. l"' The court did not recognize the attorney-client
privilege, which itself is deeply rooted in history, as one that must apply
in this context to the federal government." 16 The court also looked to
Proposed 7Rule 503, which includes public entities under the definition of
"client."" While governmental bodies would fall within this definition,
nothing in the rule or the comments addressed the attorney-client
privilege in regard to federal jury investigations.' 18 While other
compilations of law have recognized governmental bodies as "clients," '" 19
each source has concerns about
broad application of the privilege in
120
regard to governmental entities.
In examining general principles of law, the court then cited
Supreme Court case law for the proposition that the public has a right to
everyone's evidence, 12 1 and that any privileges that protect evidence
should "not be lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search of the truth."' 122 The court also held that a
privilege should be recognized only when permitting a refusal to testify
would serve a good-faith purpose that would outweigh the need to
ascertain the truth. 2 3 Given these principles, the court believed that
federal common law recognized a privilege only in certain, rare
situations.124 In the grand jury context, the court was less willing to
recognize such a privilege, as the principle that the public is entitled to
every man's evidence is "particularly applicable to grand jury
proceedings.' 2 5
The court agreed with the OIC that the logic of Nixon should apply,
even though the court conceded that Nixon was not directly
controlling. 126 The court believed that Nixon was indicative of the
principle that needs of the government's criminal justice process may
trump the same government's need for confidentiality. 127 The White
House cited Upjohn as support for its proposition that the attorney-client

115.
116.
117.

Id. SeeFED. R. EVID. 501.
In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3 d at 915.
Id. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1) reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 235

(1972).
118.

In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 916.

119. Id. Some of these compilations include the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers and the Uniform Rule of Evidence 502(a)(1).
120. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 916.
121. See id. at 918 (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
122. Id. at 918 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710).
123. Id. at 918 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
124. Id. at 918. The court then went on to cite a number of cases where the Supreme
Court has held that such a privilege applies. Id.
125. Id. at 918-19 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)).
126.
127.

In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 919.
Id.

1024

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:4

privilege is wide sweeping.128 While the court agreed with the
proposition in Upjohn that a client should be able to openly discuss the
issues of a case with an attorney, the court felt that different issues were
present in Upjohn, which upheld the privilege for a nongovernmental
organization.129 Not only is the White House not considered a separate
entity that can be punished like a corporation, but executive branch
employees, attorneys included, are under a statutory duty to report
criminal activity by other executive attorneys to the Attorney General
under 28 U.S.C. § 535(b). 130 The court also explained that a general duty
was imposed on government employees and agencies to favor disclosure
over concealment.' 31
In holding that no governmental attorney-client privilege protects
the White House from having to reveal information requested by
subpoena to a federal grand jury, the court believed that the duties of
governmental attorneys would not be made significantly more
difficult. 32 The court believed that because government agencies and
entities cannot be held criminally liable, governmental attorneys may
discuss any legal issue with a government official without fear that such
information will be exposed, as long as the topic is not potential criminal
wrongdoing by the official. 133 If an official later fears that he or she has
committed a criminal act and would like to speak to an attorney, he or
she has the option available to hire a private attorney.134 The court also
did not believe that its holding would hinder the ability of a government
35
attorney to advise an official contemplating a future course of action.
If the attorney gives an accurate depiction of the law, and the attorney
follows it, then the court believed that no harm would come from later
disclosure of that advice, which would be unlikely anyway. 136 The court
128.
129.
130.

Id. at919-20.
Id. at 920.
Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994).

131.

In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920-2 1. In support of this

proposition the court cited United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18
(1984), a case where the Court rejected a work product immunity for accountants. The
Court stated that auditors have a duty to the public that transcends any employment
relationship with the client. The auditor is to serve a "public watchdog" function to
protect the corporation's creditors and stockholders from any fraudulent activities of the
corporation. The court in In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum then went on to say
that, since the White House has greater public responsibilities than a private accountant
acting in a public capacity, the case for an attorney-client privilege for governmental
attorneys is less compelling. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 92021.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 at 921.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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here agreed with Nixon, as it also could not reach the conclusion that
governmental attorneys would "be moved to tempor the candor of their
remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the
possibility that such conversations
will be called for in the context of a
37
prosecution."'1
criminal
The second case to arise from the Whitewater scandal was In re
Bruce R. Lindsey (Lindsey).138 In Lindsey, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) held that the White House Counsel
could not assert the governmental attorney-client privilege to avoid
questioning from a grand jury if the White House Counsel had
information regarding possible criminal violations. 39 The D.C. Circuit
stated that "it would be contrary to tradition, common understanding, and
our governmental system for the attorney-client privilege to140attach to
White House Counsel in the same manner as private counsel.'
In Lindsey, Attorney General Janet Reno ordered that the
prosecutorial jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr be
expanded to investigate whether Monica Lewinsky or others perjured,
obstructed justice, or violated other federal law in connection with the
civil suit filed against President Clinton by Paula Jones. 14 1 The grand
jury subpoenaed attorney Bruce R. Lindsey, who was then serving 1as
42
both Deputy White House Counsel and Assistant to the President.
Lindsey declined to answer certain questions from the grand jury,
claiming that a governmental attorney-client privilege protected the
communications between himself, in his role as Deputy White House
Counsel, and President Clinton. 43 Independent Counsel Starr moved to
137.

Id. (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712).

138. 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
139. Id. at 1278.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1267.
142. Id.
143. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1267. Lindsey also claimed that the
executive privilege protected the communications, as did the President's personal
attorney-client privilege. Id. The district court ruled that the executive privilege could
not be claimed because Independent Counsel Starr showed that the information was both
needed and unavailable from other sources. The district court's ruling on the executive
privilege was not challenged on appeal. Id. at 1267. In regard to the personal attorneyclient privilege claim, the D.C. Circuit held that information that Lindsey learned while
acting as an intermediary between the President and his private counsel would be
protected by President Clinton's personal attorney-client privilege. However, the D.C.
Circuit held that intermediary doctrine did not apply where Lindsey consulted with
President Clinton's private counsel on litigation strategy. Lindsey's own contributions
were independent contributions to President Clinton's cause instead of being
contributions that would merely facilitate the representation of President Clinton's
personal counsel. Id. at 1280-81. Also, Lindsey could not rely on the "common interest"
doctrine, which would protect such communications heard by a third party if the third
party is a lawyer whose client shares an overlapping common interest. The D.C. Circuit
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14 4
compel Lindsey's testimony, and the district court granted that motion.
The district court recognized a governmental attorney-client privilege,
but held that, in the grand jury context, the privilege may be overcome if
sufficient need for the subpoenaed information is shown and the
information in unavailable elsewhere. 145 The Office of the Presidency, as
well as President Clinton in his personal capacity, appealed the order,
146
claiming that the governmental attorney-client privilege would apply.

Independent Counsel Starr petitioned the Supreme Court to review the
district court's decision.

47

Even though the Supreme Court denied

certiorari, the Court expected the
D.C. Circuit Court to "proceed
' 48

expeditiously to decide this case."'
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court refused to allow Lindsey to assert
a governmental attorney-client privilege when his testimony would
pertain to possible criminal activity.1 49 The D.C. Circuit noted that
federal courts usually do not recognize evidentiary privileges unless such
a privilege would "promote[] sufficiently important interests to outweigh
the need for probative evidence."' 50 Although the D.C. Circuit noted that
Exemption Five of the Freedom of Information Act' 51 would protect

governmental materials that are protected under the attorney-client
privilege, 152 the D.C. Circuit held that Exemption 5 did not in and of
53
itself create a governmental attorney-client privilege.'
The D.C. Circuit also noted that Proposed Rule 503,54 the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 5 5 and the Office of Legal
held that Lindsey's role as a governmental attorney would not allow him to withhold
information pertaining to a criminal investigation to a grand jury, even though a common
interest existed. Id. at 1282-83.
144. Id. at 1267.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. In its decision the majority refused to remand the case because of the
Supreme Court's request to expedite the disposition of the case. The majority stated that
"[s]ending this case back.., would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's request and
would do nothing but prolong the grand jury's investigation." Id. at 127 1.
149. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1278.
150. Id. at 1268 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994).
This exemption excludes from public
disclosure "intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to
a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency ..
" Id.
152. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1268 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,
9 (1996)).
153. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1269.
154. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(1), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 235 (1972).
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503, which defines "client" for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege, includes governmental entities under the definition of "clients"
that may assert the attorney-client privilege. Id.
155. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 (Proposed
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Counsel in the Department of Justice 5 6 recognize a governmental
attorney-client privilege. 57 The D.C. Circuit, however, refused to
recognize a governmental attorney-client privilege when a grand jury
investigates potential criminal activity. 58 The D.C. Circuit stated that
there is no clear principle in case law to support a governmental attorney-59
client privilege that is as broad as the private attorney-client privilege.1
The D.C. Circuit also noted that "more particularized rules may be
necessary where one agency of government claims the privilege in
resisting a demand for information by another."' 60 The court stated that,
when a governmental attorney serving the President is called to provide
evidence before a grand jury, "reason and experience,
duty, and tradition
'6
dictate that the attorney shall provide that evidence."' '
The D.C. Circuit believed that a governmental attorney also has a
duty to serve the public, as, like the President who has the constitutional
duty "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,"'' 62 Executive
Branch officers like White House Counsel take an oath to preserve and
uphold the laws of the United States. 163 Following the proposition that
"[i]f there is wrongdoing in government, it must be exposed,', 164 the D.C.
Circuit stated that the governmental attorney's duty to the public
"strongly militates against" allowing the governmental attorney to assert
the attorney-client privilege before a grand jury. 165 The D.C. Circuit
stated that it is tradition for the President to report information regarding
federal criminal violations to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
156. See Theodore B. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Confidentiality of the Attorney General's Communications in Counseling the President,6

Op. Off. Legal Counsel 481, 495 (1982); Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Disclosure of Confidential Information Received by U.S.
Attorney in the Course of Representing a FederalEmployee (Nov. 30, 1976); Ralph W.

Tarr, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Duty of Government
Lawyer Upon Receipt of IncriminatingInformation in the Course of the Attorney-Client

Relationship with Another Government Employee (Mar. 29, 1985).
157. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1269-70.
158. Id. at 1278.
159. Id.at 1272.
160. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124
cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
161. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272.
162. Id. at 1272 (quoting U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3).
163. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1272-73. The D.C. Circuit made sure to note
that the public is the client of the governmental attorney. Id. at 1273. But see id. at 1285
(Tatel, J., dissenting) ("But all lawyers, whether they work within the government or the
private sector, take an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States.").
164.

Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Governmental

Attorney, 18 MAINE L. REv. 155, 160 (1966).
165. In re BruceR. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273.
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§ 535(b).' 66

Even though the Office of the President stated that not recognizing a
privilege would chill communications between governmental attorneys
and their clients, the D.C. Circuit believed that, even though no privilege
is recognized when testifying to a grand jury, "government officials will
still enjoy the benefit of fully confidential communications with their
attorneys unless the communications reveal information relating to
possible criminal wrongdoing.' ' 167 The D.C. Circuit also stated that, if a
government official was concerned about potential criminal wrongdoing,
168
nothing would stop that official from obtaining private counsel.
The D.C. Circuit did not believe that the privilege was more
necessary because President Clinton faced the danger of impeachment, as
169
impeachment, a "political exercise" in the eyes of the D.C. Circuit,
was much different than legal proceeding. 170 It would be uncertain, in
the eyes of the D.C. Circuit, how the policies supporting the common
privilege would apply in a political proceeding such
law attorney-client
71
as impeachment.'
The D.C. Circuit believed that the limitations placed on the
executive privilege by the Supreme Court in Nixon undercut any
argument made by the Office of the President that supported a broad
governmental attorney-client privilege. 172 Recognizing the importance of
the information protected by the executive privilege, the D.C. Circuit
refused to recognize a governmental attorney-client privilege that would
be broader in scope than the executive privilege. 173 The D.C. Circuit also
did not believe that legal counsel are more vital to functioning of the
Office of the President than any other officers. 74 The D.C. Circuit stated
that "[o]nly a certain conceit among those admitted to the bar could
explain why legal advice should be on a higher plane than advice about

166. Id. at 1274, citing 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) states that "[any information ... received
in a department or agency of the executive branch of the Government relating to [federal
criminal violations from Government officers and employees] shall be expeditiously
reported to the Attorney General." 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994).
167.

In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273.

168.

Id. at 1276.

169. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton);
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 764, at 559 (5th ed. 1905).
170. In reBruceR. Lindsey, 158 F.3dat 1277.

JOSEPH

STORY,

171. Id. The D.C. Circuit noted that information obtained in preparation for
impeachment proceedings would presumably be covered by the executive privilege. The
district court's ruling on the executive privilege in this case, however, was not before the
D.C. Circuit on appeal. Id.
172. Id. at 1278.
173.
174.

Id.

Id.
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policy, or politics ....

The Seventh Circuit, following the Eighth and D.C. Circuits, then
refused to extend the governmental attorney-client privilege in the
criminal context to a state official. In In Re: A Witness Before the
Special Grand Jury (Ryan),176 the Seventh Circuit upheld the district
court's motion to compel testimony regarding communications between
the Illinois Secretary of State and its Chief Legal Counsel before a grand
7
17

jury.

In Ryan, Roger Bickel served as Chief Legal Counsel to then
Secretary of State George Ryan.178 Bickel also served as Ryan's
personal attorney, as well as the attorney for Ryan's campaign
committee.

79

The Illinois Secretary of State's Office was being

investigated for giving licenses for bribes, and federal officials wished to
inquire Bickel about these matters.1 80 Ryan refused to allow Bickel to be
questioned, citing the attorney-client privilege. 8' Federal prosecutors
then issued a subpoena from a grand jury to Bickel and also filed a
motion to compel Bickel to testify. 82 The district court granted the
83
motion, and the Seventh Circuit permitted immediate appeal.
Noting that privileges "are not lightly created nor expansively
construed,"'' 84 the Seventh Circuit refused to recognize a governmental
attorney-client privilege when a government official is faced with a
grand jury subpoena.' 85 The Seventh Circuit did not believe that the
governmental attorney-client privilege had the same historical roots as its
private counterpart, citing Lindsey as support for the proposition that the
16
governmental attorney-client privilege is both different and limited.
The Seventh Circuit found the interest of officials being fully informed
about legal matters from governmental attorneys to be subordinate to a
governmental attorney's duty to uphold the laws of the Constitution and
the nation. 187 It would be a misuse of public funds, in the Seventh
Circuit's eyes, to allow a governmental attorney, paid by the taxpayer's
88
money, to be permitted to conceal governmental wrongdoing. 1
175.

In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1278.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 295-96.
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id. at 290.
Id.
In Re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 290-91.
Id. at 291.
Id. (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710).
In Re: A Witness Before the Special GrandJury, 288 F.3d at 295.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 293.
Id.
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The Seventh Circuit saw the fact that a governmental entity, unlike
an individual or corporation, cannot be criminally liable as an important
distinction.1 89 Also, since a corporate attorney does not have the right to
keep confidential information from shareholders, 90 a governmental
attorney should not be permitted to use the attorney-client privilege to
shield the wrongdoing of a public official. 19 1 Because public officials
192
exercise the power of the state, they must act in the public interest.
Therefore, relationships between governmental attorneys and the office
they serve must be subordinate to the public interests served
by honest
1 93
exposed.
be
can
wrongdoing
where
and open government
B.

In re GrandJury Investigation: Supporting the Governmental
Attorney-Client Privilege

While the Eighth and D.C. Circuit Courts held that no privilege
exists for governmental attorneys in criminal investigations, a case from
the Second Circuit recently upheld the governmental attorney-client
privilege in such a context. In re Grand Jury Investigation involved the
investigation of the bribery of Connecticut public officials and
employees by private parties who did business with the state. 194 In the
investigation, a federal grand jury subpoenaed the testimony of Anne C.
195
George, former Chief Legal Counsel to the Governor of Connecticut.
Believing that private individuals made gifts to Governor Rowland in
return for public favors, the U.S. Attorney's Office first sought to obtain
communications between Governor Rowland, his staff, and his legal
counsel. 196 The U.S. Attorney's Office's attempt to obtain such
communications was unsuccessful, however. 197 The Government then
moved the district court to compel George to testify about confidential
communications between herself, Governor Rowland, and staff
members. 98 The court decided to wait on this decision until George
appeared in order to see if she would assert the attorney-client
99
privilege.'
When George did appear before the grand jury, she testified that she
had conversations with the Governor and other staff members regarding
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 294.
Id. (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970)).
In Re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 294.
Id.
Id.
399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 528.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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gifts and related state ethics laws.2 °° She asserted, however, that such
conversations were protected by the attorney-client privilege and refused
to answer questions regarding the content of these conversations. 20' The
district court then entered an order compelling George to answer the
questions, stating that the government attorney-client privilege must
yield to the grand jury's interests in uncovering the truth.20 2 The district
court believed that the governmental attorney must also serve in the
interests of the general public in addition to serving the governor.0 3 The
Office of Governor and Rowland both appealed the decision, and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted the Governor's motion
to expedite the appeal.20 4
The Second Circuit, referring to FRE 501, examined the common
law rules regarding the governmental attorney-client privilege.20 5 The
court recognized that a broad application of the privilege would not lead
to justice in all circumstances. 20 6 On the other hand, the court also
recognized that, to encourage clients to consult with lawyers and receive
effective legal advice, "a consistent application of the privilege over time
is necessary to promote the rule of law., 207 In light of Nixon, the court
recognized that construing privileges too broadly may be "in derogation
of the truth., 20 ' The Second Circuit, however, cited Proposed Rule 503
and section 74 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers to support the proposition that governmental entities qualify as
clients. 20 9 The court then explained that the common law generally
assumes that such a privilege exists in the context of civil suits involving
Then the court stated that courts assume that a
the government. 2
governmental attorney-client privilege exists in cases involving
Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act because such courts
have stated that this exception covers materials protected by the

200. In re GrandJury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 529.
201. Id. at 529-30.
202. Id. at 530.
203. Id.
204. Id. Before oral argument on the case, Governor Rowland resigned. The
Government then asked the new governor, M. Jodi Rell, to consider waiving the privilege
insofar as it was held by the Office of the Governor. However, Governor Rell declined to
waive the privilege. Id.
205.

In re GrandJury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 531.

206.

Id.

207.

Id.

208. Id. (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710).
209. In re GrandJury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 532. While the court recognized that
these authorities are not conclusive as to the existence at common law of such a privilege,
these examples do show that "serious legal thinkers, applying 'reason and experience,'
have considered the privilege's protections applicable in the government context." Id.
210. In re GrandJury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 532.
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privilege.2'
After providing such examples to show that the reasons for the
privilege as applied to private entities also apply to governmental
entities, the court then criticized those decisions in which courts have
held that the governmental attorney-client privilege does not apply with
the same force as in the private context. 212 The court did not accept the
Government's assumptions that the attorney's interests to the public were
more important than those to the governor.21 3 On the contrary, the court
believed that it was in the public's interest for government officials to
receive and act upon the best legal advice.2 14
In addition, the
Connecticut legislature passed a statute stating that "all confidential
communications shall be privileged and a government attorney shall not
disclose any such communications unless an authorized representative of
the public agency consents to waive the privilege. 2 15 The court found
that the people, acting through the legislature, concluded that it was in
the public interest that such communications remain privileged.21 6
While the court recognized that the relationship between a
governmental attorney and an official is not the same as that between a
private attorney and client, the court viewed the Government's argument
that such a privilege would not help encourage open communications
between client and attorney as nothing more than speculation. 217 The
court also refused to accept the idea that an official's ability to seek a
private attorney instead should make the governmental attorney-client
privilege less important. 21 8 The privilege serves to promote open clientattorney communications, and a government attorney also requires
candid information from those he serves in order to provide the best legal
advice. 219 The court also refused to furnish a balancing test to decide
211. Id. Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act permits federal government
agencies to withhold from requests "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the

agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
212.
213.
214.

In re GrandJury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 533-34.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
215. Id. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146r(b).
216. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 534. The court then went on to
mention that it does not suggest that federal courts must defer to state statutes when
determining the extent of any governmental attorney-client privilege. Id. The court
stated that it cited the statute to show that the public interest the Government believes
exists is not as obvious as the Government thinks it is. Id.
217. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 534-35; cf Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 ("A 'no harm in one more exception' rationale could
contribute to the general erosion of the privilege, without reference to common-law
principles of 'reason and experience."').
218. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 535.
219. Id.
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when the privilege should apply.22 ° In the court's opinion, such a test
would be inappropriate because "where the attorney-client privilege
applies, its protections must be reliably enforced
in order to effectuate its
221
law."
the
with
compliance
promoting
of
goal
V.

Analysis-Protecting the Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege

Over centuries, the common law has recognized the need for the
attorney-client privilege. 222 While the attorney-client privilege is firmly
established in the private setting, leaving the courts to determine when
the privilege applies in a governmental setting has led to uncertainty. In
jurisdictions that have not addressed the issue of whether the privilege
applies in the context of a grand jury setting, the uncertainty of how a
court will rule on the issue will result in a chilling effect between
governmental officials and government counsel. With the split among
the circuits, a government official cannot predict whether the privilege
will apply in a jurisdiction that has not addressed the issue. Because of
the uncertainty of confidentiality, government officials will fear that their
disclosures to government attorneys will one day be used against them in
a court of law. Without the privilege, the danger is present even for
those officials who seek advice in good faith, as well as those who didn't
even know that they have committed a criminal violation.
Because of the uncertainty that has arisen from leaving the issue to
the common law, both Congress and the state legislatures need to step in
to determine when the privilege will apply. The legislation that these
governing bodies need to pass must protect the attorney-client privilege
in the government setting. Unlike Nixon and the Whitewater cases,
government officials will not always be aware that their actions will
result in criminal liability. The state of the governmental attorney-client
privilege should not be completely based on Nixon and the Whitewater
cases, which were high profile cases involving clear criminal violations
at the highest level of government. It is not fair to punish government
officials who, in good faith, seek advice from counsel so that they may
comply with the law. Not all actions are clear criminal violations, and
one cannot expect a governmental official, even those at the highest
levels of government, to be completely knowledgeable about the law.
220. Id.
221. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 535. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S.
399 at 409 ("Balancing ex post the importance of the information against client interests,
even limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege's
application. For just that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the
contours of the privilege.").
222.

See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J.,

dissenting).
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Because ignorance of the law is not a defense, government officials
should be able to freely seek counsel from those who have undertaken to
serve them. Therefore, legislative bodies must step in to pass a statute
that will protect the governmental attorney-client privilege in both the
civil and criminal contexts.
A.

Supportfor the GovernmentalAttorney-Client Privilege in the
Criminal Context

Both judges and scholars recognize the same need for the privilege
in protecting communications between governmental attorneys and their
clients. Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr. provide a list
of reasons supporting the privilege for governmental attorneys in their
treatise on federal practice and procedure.2 23 Wright and Graham believe
that since other governmental privileges do not protect the requirements
of attorney confidentiality, the governmental attorney-client privilege
should be upheld.224 Wright and Graham also state that the privilege is
just as important in the public context as in the private context, and not
granting the privilege to governmental attorneys would put the
government at a disadvantage in litigation.225 Wright and Graham also
state that not allowing public officials to openly discuss pending
litigation with counsel would be detrimental to society as a whole.2 26 As
Judge Tatel noted in his dissent in Lindsey, the government and its
officers "need[] the same assurance of confidentiality so that [they] will
not be deterred from full and frank communication with [their]
counselors. 22 7
Those courts that do not support a governmental attorney-client
privilege assume that a government official will always know when he
has committed a criminal action. The majorities in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Lindsey stated that, if a government official
is concerned that he has committed a criminal violation, he may seek
private counsel and enjoy the benefits of the attorney-client privilege.228
This assumes, however, that a government official will always know
223.

24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 5475, at 125 (1986).

224.

Id.

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Coastal
States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Tax
Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Communications revealing...
client confidences [between IRS field personnel and IRS counsel regarding audit

activity] ... are clearly covered by the attorney-client privilege ....).
228. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir.
1997); In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1276.
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when his actions will result in a criminal investigation. Government
officials will not always know when certain actions will result in possible
criminal violations, no matter how innocent those actions may be.
Because of such uncertainty, the result will be chilled communications
between government officials and governmental attorneys, and a large
outsourcing of even the most routine cases to private attorneys. In his
dissent in Lindsey, Judge Tatel agreed that these dangers are present if
the privilege is not recognized. 229 The majority in Lindsey even
acknowledged that if a governmental attorney-client privilege is not
recognized in some instances, communications may
be chilled between
230
government officials and governmental attorneys.
Recognizing a governmental attorney-client privilege benefits
officials and the general public by promoting compliance with the law.
Those who believe that no privilege should exist are concerned with the
costs of government secrecy in light of scandals.2 3' Opponents of the
governmental attomey-client privilege state that granting the government
too much secrecy will hurt the democratic process because the public
will be deprived of information regarding the wrongdoings of officials.2 32
Those who make such claims, however, ignore the reality that
consulting counsel promotes compliance with the law. Supporting the
privilege advances the public interest by ensuring that officials will
receive sound legal advice based on honest and open communications. 233
The common law recognizes that applying the privilege consistently over
time promotes the rule of law, as lawyers are able to give sound legal
advice because they are fully informed.2 34 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court
recognized that the attorney-client privilege serves the important public
interest by assisting corporate clients in complying with the law.235
Many areas of the law of which a corporate client may seek counsel are
"hardly instinctive. 2 36 A corporation must comply with a large amount
229.
230.

See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1276 (majority opinion).

231.

See Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: Why

Privilege the Privileged?,77 IND. L.J. 469, 470 (Summer 2002).
232. Id.
233. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 932 (Kopf, J.,
dissenting) (The governmental attorney-client privilege, like any organizational attorneyclient privilege, is intended to encourage officials to consult with counsel so that the
governmental entity may comply with the law.); see also In re GrandJury Investigation,
399 F.3d 527, 531 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[S]afeguarding client confidences promotes, rather
than undermines, compliance with the law.").
234. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 531; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000).

235. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 932 (Kopf, J., dissenting)
(citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981)).
236. In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 932 (Kopf, J., dissenting)

1036

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1 11:4

of regulatory legislation, and it is necessary that corporate employees be
able to seek counsel so they can comply with this vast array of
legislation.23 7 These same interests in ensuring compliance with the law
are at stake when the client is a governmental entity. A governmental
entity is like a corporation in that it too must comply with a large body of
regulatory law. 38 The need to protect compliance with the law is even
more critical for a governmental entity, since it is the duty of the
government to promote honesty and compliance with the law. 9
Those who do not support a governmental attorney-client privilege
do not believe that Upjohn serves as solid support for a governmental
attorney-client privilege. 240 Because the White House cannot itself be
criminally liable, unlike a corporation, those who do not support a
governmental attorney-client privilege state that Upjohn cannot apply.24 1
The decision in Upjohn, however, was not based upon a corporation
being able to be liable as a separate entity for a crime.242 The Supreme
Court in Upjohn rejected the government's argument that because a
corporation could be criminally liable, no corporate attorney-client
privilege was necessary because the corporation would rather maintain
its image in the public than seek legal counsel.243 Since the Court's
decision did not turn on a corporation's ability to be criminally liable,
this distinguishing fact is irrelevant. 2 4
Those who do not believe that Upjohn should control the attorneyclient privilege also believe that the government, unlike a corporation,
has no incentive to fetter out wrongdoing.245 Although a governmental
entity cannot itself be held liable for criminal activity, making the claim
that a government has no incentive to eliminate wrongdoing is
outrageous. The President (and presumably all public officials) has an
incentive to uncover wrongdoing since he is scrutinized under the public
246
If the President does not uncover and resolve any wrongdoing
eye.
that the executive branch may be responsible for, then the President faces
the danger of loss in public support, scrutiny by the press, a tarnished

(citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 392).
237. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 392.
238. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 932 (Kopf, J.,
dissenting).
239. See id.
240. See id. at 920-21 (majority opinion).
241. See id.
242. See id. at 931 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
243. Id. (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 393 n.2).
244. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 931 (Kopf, J.,
dissenting).
245. See id. at 920.
246. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1286-87 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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historical stature, or even impeachment.2 47 Such dangers are also
present, although to a lesser extent, to state and local officials who do not
resolve wrongdoing in their offices. In a number of cases, not exposing
such wrongdoing may not only lead to decreased support, but career
suicide to one's livelihood in politics.
Those who do not support a governmental attorney-client privilege
will note a number of distinctions between the Second Circuit case
supporting the privilege and those of the Seventh, Eighth, and D.C.
Circuits denying the privilege. An opponent of the governmental
attorney-client privilege in the criminal context may point out that a
Connecticut statute formulated a governmental attorney-client
privilege.2 48 One could easily make the claim that the presence of a
statute controlling the issue would be dispositive of the case, and that this
holding should not be used to bind other jurisdictions where no statute
has been enacted.
The Second Circuit pointed out the statute, however, in order to
show that the public interest does not necessarily mandate disclosure in
the criminal context. 249 The Second Circuit also noted the benefits 25
of0
upholding the governmental attorney-client privilege in its analysis,
and stated that, even without the statute, one could easily reach the
conclusion that governmental attorney-client privilege promotes
important public interests even if the privilege would hinder a criminal
investigation. 251 Nowhere in the Second Circuit's decision did the court
limit its holding to the state of Connecticut, meaning the decision was
binding on the entire Second Circuit. Apparently, the court felt as
though the policy reasons supporting a governmental attorney-client
privilege in the criminal context were strong enough to bind such a
privilege upon the entire Second Circuit.
Another important distinction one may note between the Second
Circuit case supporting the privilege and the decisions of the Eighth and
D.C. Circuits that deny the privilege is that the latter cases pertain not to
a state governmental entity, as the Second Circuit case supporting the
privilege did, but to the White House. Criminal violations are certainly
more problematic in our nation's highest office than in a state governor's
office. Therefore, opponents of a widespread governmental attorneyclient privilege will claim that a greater public interest in exposing such
wrongdoing exists in the Office of the President, and that the President
247.
248.

See id. at 1287.
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 534 (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-146r(b)).
249.
250.

In re GrandJury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 534.
See id. at 533-35.

251.

Id. at 534.
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should enjoy less of a privilege than those at lower levels of government.
Judges agree, however, that protection of the privilege is just as
important, if not more important, for the President of the United States.
In the In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dissent, Judge Kopf
stated that the White House is no less entitled to the privilege than a state
government. 252 Judge Tatel in Lindsey noted that it is especially
important that the attorney-client privilege extend to communications
between the Office of the President and White House Counsel.2 53 Tatel
stated that "[n]o President can navigate the treacherous waters of postWatergate government, make controversial official legal decisions ... or
even know when he might need private counsel, without confidential
legal advice. ' 2 54 Uncertainty in whether or not communications will be
held in confidence will cause the President to shift legal responsibilities
to private legal counsel who, unlike the White House Counsel who
specifically
serve the President, have not undertaken this important
25 5
duty.
Opponents of the governmental attorney-client privilege often state
that if an official desires confidential communications with counsel, the
official can obtain a private attorney and enjoy a strong attorney-client
privilege.25 6 Such an argument simply assumes that a government
official can afford private counsel. 7 In a high profile office such as that
of the President, one can easily assume, as the Eighth and D.C. Circuit
did,258 that a government official could afford private counsel. Even
though the President may have the financial resources to hire outside
counsel, many lesser officials in state or local governments may not. The
inability of lower government officials to afford counsel is one reason
why the governmental attorney-client privilege should apply at all levels.
And, if one accepts the assumption that state and local officials do not
have the legal education and resources that officials in higher offices do,
the need to have government counsel readily available to answer any
questions becomes even more apparent.
Admittedly, cases will arise where a government official has
committed a clear violation of the law, knows he or she has committed a
clear violation of the law, and will seek the advice from government
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 926 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1287 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id.
See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1276; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces

Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921.
257. See Todd A. Ellinwood, "In the Light of Reason and Experience": The Casefor
a Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege,2001 Wis. L. REV. 1291, 1325 (2001).
258. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1276; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum. 112 F.3d at 921.
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counsel regarding the proper course of action. Sometimes, unfortunately,
government officials will seek advice from government counsel so that
they may break the law. Not every case, however, falls into these
categories. Protection of the governmental attorney-client privilege must
be provided to those officials in those cases where the government
official did not commit a clear violation of the law. Protection must also
be provided in those cases where a government official acted in such a
manner where he committed a criminal violation, but was not aware that
he did so. Not every case will fall within the fact pattern of Nixon or the
Whitewater cases, and the state of the governmental attorney-client
privilege must reflect this reality.
B.

The Needfor Legislative Action

Usually, the development of evidentiary privileges has been left to
the common law via Federal Rule of Evidence 501 .259 As the circuit split
shows, however, leaving the development of the governmental attorneyclient privilege to the courts has resulted in uncertainty as to whether the
privilege exists. For reasons previously discussed, an uncertain attorneyclient privilege is only slightly more effective than not recognizing a
privilege at all. In order to prevent the chilling effects and the
outsourcing of legal work to private attorneys, it is the duty of the
legislature to pass a statute that creates a strong governmental attorneyclient privilege.
In In re Grand Jury Investigation, the case involving the Governor
of Connecticut, the court noted that Connecticut has already passed a
statute that protects the governmental attorney-client privilege. 260 The
Connecticut statute provides for a governmental attorney-client privilege
that is as strong in the criminal setting as it is in the civil setting. 261 The
statute provides that, in both criminal and civil cases, "all confidential
communications shall be privileged and a government attorney shall not
disclose any such communications unless an authorized representative of
the public agency consents to waive the privilege and allow such
disclosure. 2 62 The legislatures of the other states who have not passed
such statutes, as well as the U.S. Congress, must follow suit and pass
similar statutes. The strong policy of having attorneys readily available
to inform government officials about the law so that they may comply
with the law demands that such statutes be passed. This vital public
259.
260.

See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 915.
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 529. For the statute protecting

the privilege, see CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146r(b).

261.
262.

See CoNN. GEN. STAT.
Id.

§ 52-146r(b).

1040

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:4

interest is especially true where the official does not know the law or
where the area of the law is gray.
While many support the governmental attorney-client privilege,
many believe that the privilege should not be absolute. Some advocate
the use of a balancing test in determining when the attorney-client
privilege would attach to communications made by government officials
to government attorneys.263 Using a balancing approach in applying the
privilege, however, would still have the same chilling effect that would
result from not recognizing a governmental attorney-client privilege.2 64
Such a balancing approach has already been criticized by the
Supreme Court. In Upjohn, the Court stated that "such a 'case-by-case'
basis may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the
boundaries of the attorney-client privilege.
,265 Judge Tatel, in his
dissent in Lindsey, warned that the uncertainty that a balancing test
would impose would still make government officials hesitant to consult
governmental attorneys.26 6 Even though a balancing test would provide
more protection to communications than no recognition of a
governmental attorney-client privilege, the possibility that such
communications would not enjoy the privilege will still chill
communications between government officials and governmental
counsel.2 67 Therefore, a statute that provides for a strong governmental
attorney-client privilege in both the criminal and civil contexts is the
more viable alternative.
In recognizing a governmental attorney-client privilege, however,
one must take care that the privilege is not abused. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo stated that "[t]he privilege takes flight if the [attorney-client]
relation is abused., 268 Such a principle must be upheld in order to help
prevent governmental wrongdoing, the main danger cited by those who
oppose a governmental attorney-client privilege. In drafting a statute
protecting the governmental attorney-client privilege, legislatures must
add a safeguard so that the privilege is not abused.
One powerful safeguard that the legislatures must include in any
governmental attorney-client privilege statute is the crime-fraud
263.

See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 926 (Kopf, J.,

dissenting).
264. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
265. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 396.
266. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("[W]hether a
court abrogates the privilege by applying [a] balancing test.., or [by holding that the
governmental attorney-client privilege always dissolves when a governmental official is
subpoenaed by a grand jury], the chilling effect is precisely the same.").
267. Id. (citing Swidler, 524 U.S. at 406-4 10).
268. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1287 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Clark v.
United States. 289 U.S. 1. 15 (1933)).
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exception to the privilege. The crime-fraud exception would dissolve the
privilege if the governmental counsel assisted the official in furthering a
crime. 269 If a government official inquires about the law from an
attorney so that the official may break the law, then such
communications would not be privileged. The crime-fraud exception
states that
[t]he attorney-client privilege does not apply to a communication
occurring when a client:
(a) consults a lawyer for the purpose, later accomplished, of
obtainng assistance to engage in a crime or fraud or aiding a
third person to do so, or
(b) regardless of the client's purpose at the time of consultation,
uses the lawyer's270advice or other services to engage in or assist
a crime or fraud.
By enforcing this exception, one category of cases that worries those
who oppose the governmental attorney-client privilege will be
eliminated-those cases where the government official seeks advice
from government counsel so he can break the law and uses the privilege
as a shield to cover the communications with the attorney.
Other safeguards exist apart from those that would need to be added
legislatively. If sufficient evidence existed to show that governmental
counsel committed a crime, for example, nothing would shield the
government counsel from being indicted.271 In the Office of the
President, the office whose wrongdoing the Eighth and D.C. Circuits
were particularly concerned with, additional safeguards exist. Such
safeguards include congressional oversight, press scrutiny, concern for
historical reputation, and the danger of impeachment.2 72 Danger to one's
reputation, or even career, serves as a powerful deterrent from acting
unethically. Although these safeguards would be available to a lesser
extent with state and local officials, such safeguards are still present.
Even though government officials must be able to have full and
frank communications with governmental attorneys, one may conceive
some situations where the attorney-client privilege must give way to
assist in bringing government officials who have committed criminal
wrongdoings to justice. While Judge Kopf and Judge Tatel both agree
that a governmental attorney-client privilege should be recognized, they
269.

In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1287 (Tatel, J., dissenting).

270.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000).

271.

See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1287 (Tatel, J., dissenting).

272.

See id.
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also agree that the governmental attomey-client privilege should not be
absolute.2 73 Accordingly, in some very limited instances, perhaps
limitation of the governmental attorney-client privilege would suit
important public interests. Any limitation of the privilege, however,
should not erode "the well-recognized principle that the government...
is legitimately entitled to the attorney-client privilege. 274
Because any limitation of the privilege should be recognized in only
narrow situations, the main exception to the privilege should be the
crime-fraud exception. Lawyers who are paid with taxpayers' money
should not be permitted to assist a government official in perpetrating
criminal activity and fraud. In areas where the government attorney is
not perpetrating fraud, but only doing his duty to serve the government
official he has undertaken to serve, the governmental attorney-client
privilege should apply. The governmental attorney-client privilege is
well recognized in civil suits. 275 The privilege should apply with equal

force in the criminal setting as well. Some are concerned that public
funds are being used to pay an attomey to assist an official who has
committed a criminal violation in litigation. 76 The result is the same,
however, regardless of whether the privilege is asserted with a
government attorney or a private attomey-information is still being
shielded from the public.
The best rule for application of the governmental attorney-client
privilege is a legislatively crafted rule that applies a strong privilege in
both the civil and criminal contexts. The Connecticut statute is an
excellent example of a statute that provides the proper protection. The
statute must provide the same level of protection that the Connecticut
statute does, with an addition to the statute to prevent officials from
using the privilege to shield crime or fraud that the official intentionally
committed after seeking counsel. Such a statute would read as follows:
(a) As used in this section:

273. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1283 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) (supporting a
governmental attorney-client privilege, although stating that he has "no doubt that
government lawyers working in executive departments and agencies enjoy a reduced
privilege in the face of grand jury subpoenas .. ");In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d at 926 (Kopf, J., dissenting) (Judge Kopf states that "[t]here is no reason
to deny the well-recognized principle that the government.., is legitimately entitled to
the attorney-client privilege." Given the Supreme Court's holding in Nixon, however,
"the White House privilege gives way to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum ...provided
the procedural protections of Nixon have been observed.").
274. In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 926 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
275. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3dat 1271.
276. In Re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir.
2002).
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1. "Public entity" includes the government body or agency
itself, as well as any of its officers, officials, employees, or
agents acting in the performance of his or her duties, or within
the scope of his or her employment, with the body or agency.
2. "Government attorney" is an attorney who is an employee of
a public entity whose tasks may include, but are not limited to,
providing legal advice or handling matters in litigation for the
public entity.
(b) Subject to the limitations provided in subsection (c), in any
criminal or civil case or proceeding or in any legislative or
administrative proceeding, all written and oral communications made
by a public entity to a government attorney pertaining to legal
matters, inquiries, issues, or advice sought by, and pertaining to, that
public entity shall be privileged, and a government attorney shall not
disclose any such communications unless an authorized
representative of the public entity consents to waive the privilege and
allow such disclosure.
(c) If the public entity obtains legal services from a governmental
attorney and uses such services to commit, or assist a third party in
committing, a crime or fraud, the privilege described in subsection (a)
will be considered to be waived and will not apply. This exception
applies regardless of the public entity's purpose at the time of
consultation.
(d) This section should not be taken to mean that the attorney-client
privilege is eliminated if a public entity utilizes
the services of an
277
attorney who is not a government attorney.
The statute above provides for a strong governmental attorney-client
privilege in both the civil and criminal settings. Those who consult with
a government attorney in good faith with the intention of complying with
the law will enjoy the privilege.
The statute will also prevent
government attorneys from assisting officials in violating the law. In
those cases where government officials seek counsel in order to commit
a crime or fraud, the crime-fraud exception listed in subsection (c) would
eliminate the privilege. This exception addresses the concern that
attorneys who serve public officials and are paid by the public fisc will
use the privilege to shield criminal activity in which the attorney himself
277. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146r(b) served as the starting point in drafting this
statute. After making changes in the language of this statute, I added a modified version
of the crime-fraud exception. The crime-fraud exception can be found in RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000).
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played an active role.
With the crime-fraud exception in place, it is possible that an
official would seek counsel from a governmental attorney and then,
based on that counsel, act in good faith, but still break the law by
accident. With the complexities that many who work in government
face, such a possibility is conceivable. Under subsection (c) above, the
privilege would not apply to such a government official. At first, it may
not seem fair that an official who breaks the law and then seeks counsel
would fully enjoy the privilege while the official described above who
acted in good faith would not. The attorney in the latter case, however,
will be given the full opportunity to explain when he testifies that the
official acted in good faith based on his advice. Should the trier of fact
find the attorney's testimony credible, the official should be relieved
from criminal liability. Such a rule will also have the effect of ensuring
that government entities hire competent counsel who will ensure that
their clients comply with every aspect of the complex laws government
officials face.
Another possibility that some may find bothersome is that when a
government official does break the law, he will use the services of the
government attorney, who is paid by the taxpayers' money, to relieve
him of criminal liability. One must look, however, at the alternative if no
governmental attorney-client privilege exists. If no governmental
attorney-client privilege existed, the government official would still be
able to enjoy the privilege if he hired private counsel. By asserting the
privilege in this manner, the government official would still succeed in
shielding information from the public. So, regardless of whether or not
the governmental attorney-client privilege exists, the official will still be
able to assert the privilege. In the end the result is the same. The only
solution to this problem of shielding evidence from the public is to
eliminate the entire privilege, which is certainly not a viable alternative.
The only way to act to establish a strong governmental attorneyclient privilege is through such a legislatively crafted rule. This is
especially true in the realm of our federal government. The Seventh,
Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have already held that the governmental
attorney-client privilege is weakened in the face of a grand jury
subpoena.27 8 Given the recency of these decisions, it is unlikely that
these circuits will reverse these decisions anytime soon. Also, given the
small number of legal issues that are decided by the Supreme Court, it is
questionable whether the Court will ever address the issue. Therefore,
278.

See In Re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d at 290; In re

Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1271; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d

at 917.
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unless the legislatures of the states and federal government act, Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 and the courts will continue to determine the scope
of the attorney-client privilege. Because of the uncertainty that will
result from this approach, this option is certainly not an attractive one.
VI. Conclusion
In order to ensure that government officials know the law,
especially in areas of the law that may be gray, officials must feel free to
discuss matters of the law with governmental counsel.279 If government
officials fear that their communications will one day be used against
them, a chilling effect will result where government officials will be
afraid to discuss matters with governmental attorneys.2 80 Government
officials must know the law in order to comply with the law, 281 and they
will have a distorted picture of the law if officials do not give attorneys a
full picture of the issue at hand.2 82
After Nixon, one must rightfully fear any wrongdoing perpetrated
by government officials. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that
"sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice
or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the
client. ''28 3
In Nixon, the Court even stated that confidential
communication "is fundamental to the operation of Government.... ,,284
Officials cannot be afraid that a particular statement made to an attorney
will one day be used against him. If an official would know ex ante
whether all of his actions would be criminal violations, then the
governmental attorney-client privilege would be less important. Because
of the gray areas that exist in the law, however, an official cannot be
certain that acting in good-faith alone will make him free and clear of
any criminal liability.
For this reason, and in order to serve the ever-important public
interest of promoting compliance with the law, the governmental
attorney-client privilege must be upheld in both the civil and the criminal
contexts. Because of the uncertainty that has resulted from leaving the
determination of the privilege to the common law, the best way to
promote such a privilege is through the legislature. An uncertain
privilege is no privilege, and one can only guess whether the court will
279. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 932 (8th Cir. 1997)
(Kopf, J., dissenting).
280. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting).
281. See id. at 1285 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
282. See id. at 1284.
283. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
284. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).

1046

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:4

uphold the privilege in jurisdictions that have not ruled on the issue.
Therefore, the vital need to have officials who can seek the legal advice
necessary to comply with the law demands that the state legislatures and
Congress work toward formulating a statute that provides for a strong
governmental attorney-client privilege in both the criminal and civil
contexts.

